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Abstract
The correlation between foreign aid and democratization has a contentious history in the
field of international affairs. The paradigm that foreign aid can be used to achieve
democratization in foreign political systems underscores to the centrality of democracy in
Western societies. This thesis explores the relationship between foreign aid and
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa.

ii

Acknowledgements

I dedicate this monograph to my beloved father, Mr. William Clifford Whittington (1950
- 2011). I suffered the tragedy of his untimely passing during my graduate studies at
Washington University in St. Louis. My Father epitomized generosity and service.
Moreover, he prided himself on the accomplishments of his three children. The legacy of
my father’s work-ethic compelled me to continue my graduate studies, uninterrupted, in
spite of his passing. I am eternally grateful for his love and enduring devotion to our
family.
I would like to thank the International Affairs Program of University College, I feel
privileged to have obtained the Master of Arts Degree from this Program. I would
especially like to convey my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Andrew C.
Sobel, as well as my gratefulness to the other members of my defense committee:
Professor Marvin H. Marcus, and Mr. Repps Hudson.
Furthermore, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my employer, The
Honorable Russ Carnahan (MO-3rd), Member of the United States House of
Representatives. The Office of Representative Carnahan has been an ardent supporter of
my graduate studies, and I appreciate Rep. Carnahan for the accommodations that were
granted to me given my academic responsibilities.
Finally, I would be remiss, if I failed to acknowledge the contribution of my faith to the
successful completion of my graduate program. I am a devout Christian, and I am
eternally grateful to my Lord, Jesus Christ, for His divine province in providing me with
the opportunity to study at Washington University in St. Louis.

iii

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

iii

List of Tables

v

Introduction

1

Explaining Democratization in Africa

5

China in Africa

19

Empirical Findings

30

Conclusion

39

References

46

iv

List of Tables

Table 1: Democracy in Africa, 1989 to 1999

6

Table 2: The Democracy Template

15

Table 3: Freedom in the World Aggregate Scores, 2001 – 2011

31

Table 4: Leading U.S. Assistance Recipients in Africa

33

Table 5: Selected African Countries with Large Reported
Aid and Investment Projects, 2002 - 2007

35

Table 6: Chinese FDI & Aid vs. USAID &World Bank

37

v

Introduction

The correlation between foreign aid and democratization has a contentious history
in the field of international affairs. The paradigm that foreign aid can be used to achieve
democratization in foreign political systems underscores to the centrality of democracy in
Western societies. This thesis explores the relationship between foreign aid and
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. The research question is: What have been the
consequences of foreign aid on democratization in Africa?
To begin our discussion, the terms foreign aid and democracy must to be defined.
Foreign aid is defined as “An international transfer of resources that would not have
taken place as a result of market forces…it includes grants, and loans made at subsidized
interest rates, provided by governments or by international finance institutions”
(Goldsmith 2001, 412). Democracy can be characterized as a “Pluralistic national
political system where people are reasonably free to express their political demands and
to hold rulers to account” (Goldsmith 2001, 412). Although multi-party elections are an
indicator of democracy, they should not be taken as the only measure of democracy;
ultimately, elections are necessary, yet insufficient in measuring democracy.
Exploring the consequences of foreign aid on African democratization can be
perplexing given the foreign aid policies of Western governments towards Africa. Since
the 1960s, specifically U.S. foreign aid policy has been rhetorically based upon the
United States’ commitment to devote some of its wealth to combating human suffering
around the world. Prompted by the tenets of modernization theory, in 1961 President
John Kennedy called for the creation the U.S. Agency for International Development
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(USAID). Subsequently, the U.S. Congress moved to ratify the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, which established foreign assistance as a central component of U.S. foreign
policy. Yet despite grandiose narratives of America’s commitment to promote economic
development, and good governance worldwide, these ambitions became susceptible to the
U.S. Cold War agenda. Hence, historically, American foreign aid became nothing more
than an extension of realpolitik policy objectives.
Beginning with Ghana in 1957, as independence dawned across Africa, newly
liberated African states found themselves the benefactors of American foreign aid.
Moreover, aid was perceived by the Kennedy administration as essential in lifting newly
independent territories out of poverty, making them less likely to undergo a communist
revolution.

However, as the Cold War preceded American aid became a tool of

persuasion for the United States. African states that politically aligned with the West
were rewarded with aid. It is from here that proxy contests between the United States and
Soviet Union began to unfold across Africa.
Moreover, when analyzing the United States allocation of aid to Africa it is
essential to compare two chapters in America aid policy. During the Cold War, the
United States allocated aid based on the expressed ideological position of the recipient
state.

This approach was often sold as protecting African states from communism;

however, it proved to be quite detrimental to democracy. In many circumstances, this
approach worked to maintain the powerful grip of non-democratic regimes.
The second chapter of American foreign aid towards Africa was promoted by the
end of the Cold War.

The fall of the Soviet Union gave way to a global wave of

democratization. During the 1990s the United States implemented foreign aid policies
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that actively seek to promote democracy. The 1990s is a significant decade for two
reasons. First, it is during this decade that democracy assistance was adopted as a new
foreign aid approach by the United States. Secondly, the 1990s signify America’s shift
away from its Cold War approach to foreign aid, and United States foreign aid practices
became consistent with America’s rhetorical narrative on aid. During this chapter the
United States strategically redirected aid from African dictators and tyrants, and
reallocated it to civic initiatives mobilizing to remove these actors. For the last 20 years
foreign aid in the form of economic development assistance, humanitarian aid, and
democracy assistance has flowed into African political economies, yet it is unclear
whether this purposed capital has yielded its intended outcome.
This paper hypothesizes that post-Cold War foreign aid has advanced
democratization in Africa. The monograph is organized in three sections. The first section
presents qualitative findings on the impact of foreign aid on democratization in Africa.
In this section democratization is designated as the dependent variable. To explain this
variable, the study will put forth four explanatory variables: foreign aid, aid
conditionality, international political trends, and democracy assistance. Moreover, this
section will address each explanatory variable with the review of scholarly literature that
presents both quantitative and qualitative evidence relevant to the variable.
From here the second section will broaden its attention to explore foreign direct
investment (FDI) and its consequences on democratization. The vast natural resources of
Africa have caught the attention of foreign investors from emerging markets. Most
notably, the People’s Republic of China has invests heavily in African oil exploration.
Chinese FDI is accompanied by infrastructure development aid for the recipient
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government. Proponents of Chinese involvement in Africa claim that FDI is more
effective than foreign aid in helping African states realize their infrastructure
development goal. This section will examine the validity of this claim, and whether
Chinese FDI has advanced or hampered democratization in Africa.
The third section will explore three political indexes and will compare subSaharan ratings on these indexes against their official development assistance (ODA) as
reported by the World Bank. Official development assistance can be defined as “a net
transfer in cash or kind that is administered with economic development in mind and that
has a grant element of at least 25 percent” (Goldsmith 2001, 426).

Finally, the

conclusion will address region specific challenges that impede democratization in Africa.
This will take a panoramic view in analyzing the consequences of foreign assistance on
democratization in Africa.

4

Explaining Democratization in Africa

Foreign Aid
Arthur A. Goldsmith in “Donor, Dictators, and Democrats in Africa” presents
findings that demonstrate a corollary relationship between foreign aid and African
democratization in the post-Cold War era. Goldsmith cites three indicators of heightened
political engagement in African political systems. First, Goldsmith notes that African
counties are beginning to tolerate liberal-democratic norms of political participation
(Goldsmith 2001, 418).
Second, the author notes an increase in the number of political contests held
across Africa. Specifically, Goldsmith notes that between 1990 and 2000, 78 political
elections were collectively held by African States. This is in stark contrast to the 126
elections held between the years of 1960 to 1989. Additionally, during the 1990s there
were 21 opposition election victories across Africa, as opposed to the merely one
opposition victory occurring between 1960 and 1989 (Goldsmith 2001, 422). Goldsmith
also notes increased retirement of African heads of states. He states, “The threat of
losing an election also may account for the increasing rate of leader retirement-nine in the
1990s versus only eight in the previous three decades” (Goldsmith 2001, 422).
Third, the score of African states on international indexes measuring political
freedom rose during the 1990s. Goldsmith cites the Freedom House index, and he notes
that from 1989 to 1999 many African governments improved their mean index score
from 2.4 to 3.6. Additionally, he notes the Ted Robert Gurr Polity98 Project at the
University of Maryland, which measured political openness. Within the Gurr index 41
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sub-Saharan states received the mean sore of 3.0 in 1998 opposed to a score of 0.8 ten
years earlier in 1989. The index scores range from 0 to 10, with 10 designating most
open (Goldsmith 2001, 425).
Though Goldsmith presents convincing evidence that African states begin to
implement democratic reforms in the 1990s, it is still unclear whether aid is consequential
in the democratization of sub-Saharan states.

To address this concern, Goldsmith

provides regression data to test 12 explanatory variables of Africa democratization.

Table 1
Democracy in Africa, 1989 to 1999a

Freedom House Index
(1= least freedom, 7= most)

Polity98 Index
(0= least openness, 10=most)

1989

1999

1989

1998

Mean Score

2.4

3.6a

0.8

3.0a

Number of
Countries

47

48

41

41

Source: Goldsmith, Arthur. 2001. “Dictators and Democrats in Africa.” Journal of Modern African Studies
Vol.39 No. 3 (September): 425.
a
99 percent confidence

These explanatory variables include official development assistance, effective
development assistance, gross domestic product per capita, urbanization, ethnic
heterogeneity, religion, population, and land mass. The variables are tested against ODA,
and effective development assistance (EDA)—“the sum of grants and grant equivalents
of official loans”—for 10-year increments (Goldsmith 2001, 428). Goldsmith’s findings
present a monotonically positive regression relationship between democracy index scores
6

and ODA and EDA.

Moreover, there was a statistical increase in the regression

relationship between ODA and EDA and democracy index scores in the 1990s
(Goldsmith 2001, 432).

The scholar also provided another measurement model to

address concerns of endogeneity, and the positive relationship between aid and
democratization remained.
Goldsmith concludes that there is a small, yet positive corollary relationship
between foreign aid and African democratization. He notes that donors post-Cold War
aid allocation policies “can help boost the budding democratic movements” of subSaharan countries, thus giving way for the initial phases of democratization (Goldsmith
2001, 432). Nevertheless, Goldsmith affirms that the work of democracy consolidation
will only be achieved with local buy-in from citizens and African civil society.
A divergent assessment of the correlations between foreign aid and
democratization in Africa is presented by Stephen Knack in “Does Foreign Aid Promote
Democracy?” Knack’s quantitative analysis is composed of a large sample of 102 and
countries—33 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa—that have received foreign aid. His
findings span 25-year period, with his data beginning in 1975 through 2000. Furthermore,
the scholar notes the significance of 1975, as the year in which the U.S. Foreign
Assistance Act was amended to incorporate Section 116, which conditioned the
allocation of aid on the incorporation of civil liberties and the rule of law by recipient
governments (Knack 2004, 252). This was done in an effort to promote democracy and
human rights. Although conditions were placed on aid, Knack concludes “no evidence is
found that aid promotes democracy” (Knack 2004, 251). He acknowledges that his

7

findings do not prove that democracy programs are completely ineffective, but that
instances of these programs’ success are limited and sporadic (Knack 2004, 251).
Knack’s quantitative findings are derived from states’ ratings on two democracy
indexes: 1) the Freedom House Freedom in the World Index, a measure of level of
political freedom and civil liberties, and 2) the Polity Index, a measure of how executive
leadership is selected (Knack 2004, 254). To test the correlation between foreign aid and
democratization, Knack creates a comparative regression between official development
assistance, GDP and eight other indicators, among these being literacy, infant mortality,
and population rates. He argues: “If aid promotes democracy, then countries with higher
aid levels should exhibit improving ratings on democracy indexes over time, other things
equal” (Knack 2004, 256). Knack eventually notes that both indexes show a clear trend
towards democratization among the nations sampled; however, he does not attribute this
to foreign aid but to a third wave of democratization triggered by fall of the Soviet Union.
Though Knack provides a quantitatively sound analysis of the effect of foreign aid
on democracy, he neglects to address the international political circumstance of the time
period in question, which arguably undercuts the soundness of his conclusion.

He

references the significance of 1975 as the year the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act is
amended to include Section 116. However, Knack fails to address the circumstances of
the international systems at this time, and more specifically that the United States and its
Western allies are engaged in the Cold War.

Ultimately, though the promotion of

democracy and human rights is addressed in Section 116, it was apparent that American
aid policy did not fully implement this mandate in its aid allocation procedure. Given
that Knack’s evaluation of state ratings spans a 25-year period, his results have the
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potential to be skewed. Arguably this reality has led scholars like Goldberg to divide
their findings in ten-year increments.

Politically Conditioned Aid
In “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” Stephen
Brown qualitatively examines the impact of conditioned foreign aid on the achievement
of consolidated forms of democratic governance in sub-Saharan recipient states. Brown
limits his findings to the decade of the 1990s. He notes that the end of the Cold War
initiated reforms in Western aid distribution policies. It is during this time that donors
begin to condition bilateral aid upon recipient states’ implementation of democratic
political reforms. The most notable of aid conditions is the introduction of multiparty
political participation and popular elections (Brown 2005, 182). Prior to the 1990s
several African political systems maintained constitutional statutes which outlawed the
formation of opposition political parties, thereby creating a one-party political system.
Known as African Democracy, political opponents to the state party were subjected to
punitive repercussions under the law.
Moreover, Brown concludes that the implementation of politically conditioned
bilateral aid, though instrumental in providing democratic openings in sub-Sahara
political systems, undermines democracy consolidation in African recipient states (Brown
2005, 182). To support his argument, Brown provides three examples.
First, he notes that political parties in Western societies are formed around class
or social interests, whereas in sub-Saharan societies political associations are primarily
based upon ethnic identity. A rapid transition to multi-party democracy can often foment
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ethnic rivalries for political control of state resources, thereby undermining the
consolidation of democracy (Brown 2005, 183). This assertion harkens back to the
original justification for one-party African democracy.

In the years following

independence, African autocrats evaded calls for multi-party politics, claiming that
multiple political parties would give rise to tribalism. They argued that political parties
would be nothing more than vehicles leading to the fracturing of the electorate, thus
giving rise to ethnic conflict and civil discord.
Next, Brown claims that African states will find ways to evade political
conditionality by making the minimum democratic reforms necessary to maintain their
aid. Brown notes many African autocrats have learned to “[Allow] opposing parties to
compete, but not win; [to permit] an independent press to operate, but not freely; [and to
allow] civic groups to function, but not effectively” (Brown 2005, 184). Furthermore, by
donors rewarding government actors for modest political reforms, they may undermine
domestic actors mobilizing for more substantive democratic reform, thereby undermining
democracy consolidation (Brown 2005, 188).
Finally, Brown argues that donors tend to be initially involved in applying
pressure onto recipient governments to allow multiparty elections and other forms of
procedural democracy, but gradually democratization become secondary to other foreign
policy goals such as economic liberalization. Brown claims, “The U.S. has historically
subordinated democracy promotion to its security interests, since democracy, contrary to
current rhetoric, is not always perceived as serving U.S. interests” (Brown 2005, 189).
Furthermore, based upon the argument, it can be logically inferred that politically
conditioned bilateral aid, though promoting procedural democracy, can curtail the full
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consolidation of democracy within the African recipient government. Brown concludes
his article by advocating for the adoption of a gradual democratization process for
African governments.

Democracy Assistance: A New Type of
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 brought about a stark shift in American aid
policies. In the decade following the Cold War, the United States took the lead as the
largest donor to democratization in foreign political systems. In Aiding Democracy
Abroad: The Learning Curve, Thomas Carothers discusses the evolution of democracy
assistance aid.

Carothers characterizes democracy assistance as: “Aid specifically

designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a
democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (Carothers
1999, 8).

From here, Carothers surveys the impact, outcomes, and limitations of

democracy assistance.

As the Vice President of Global Policy at the Carnegie

Endowment for Peace, Carothers provides a practitioner’s assessment of democracy
assistance and its role as a relatively new approach in U.S. foreign assistance.
To begin his assessment, Carothers discusses what he terms the core strategy of
democracy assistance, which includes three models of democratization: 1) democracy
template; 2) political sequencing; and 3) institution modeling. The goal of democracy
promoters is to assess the democratic trajectory of a political system and then allocate aid
resources in way that will result in instances of consolidation. The core strategy provides
democracy promoters with a guide for how to aid democratic transitions already
underway in political systems. However, Carothers notes that the desire by democracy
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promoters to place political systems neatly into one of these models can lead to
inflexibility.
The democracy template is composed of three stages of democracy assistance:
elections, state institutions, and civil society. When a democratic opening is achieved,
democracy promoters initiate assistance by concentrating resources on the holding of
“free and fair” popular elections. Once an election is achieved, democracy assistance is
then directed at state institutions; this is typically done by providing assistance to draft a
constitution. Carothers notes that along with establishing a government, a constitution
should ideally provide for liberal governance in the form of separation of powers, rule of
law, and the protection of civil and political rights (Carothers 1999, 87). The final
chapter of the democracy template is civil society. During this stage democracy
promoters work to activate a vibrant civil society sector that advocates for citizens
interests, as well as holds political leaders to account.
Building upon the democracy template, political sequencing is the second model
of the core strategy. Under this model, a political system has already achieved a political
opening, and has elected a transitional government that is charged with instituting liberal

political reforms forming a new democratic government.

With the initial political

transition achieved, democracy assistance is directed at consolidation. Democracy
promoters work to augment the “supply of democracy” provided by government
institutions, as well as the “demand for democracy” by citizens (Carothers 1999, 87).
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Institution modeling is the final model applied by democracy promoters, and it is
the process of transforming the institutions in a transitional country to resemble state
institutions in Western democracies. To further expound on this point, Carothers notes:
The self- assigned role of democracy assistance is to stimulate and speed up
such institution modeling. Each project in the typical U.S. portfolio aims to
shape a particular sector or institution along the lines of its counterpart in
Western democracies. This is why training is such a common method of
democracy assistance (Carothers 1999, 90).

The rationale for institution modeling is the naïve notion that if a political system can
reproduce the institutional frameworks of Western states then it will inevitably achieve
democracy (Carothers 1999, 90).
From the core strategy, Carothers moves on to present four case studies of
countries that have undergone democratic transitions in the 1990s. He notes that each
country had different government structures, which are representative of the region. His
cases represent the democratic transition witnessed during the third wave of democracy.
Carothers also notes that the United States supported non-democratic regimes in all four
countries, and eventually provided democracy assistance to each country.

These

countries are: 1) Guatemala, a right-wing military dictatorship; 2) Nepal, a partyless
monarchy; 3) Zambia, a single-party African democracy; and 4) Romania, a communist
totalitarian dictatorship (Carothers 1999, 65).
Despite their divergent political structures, Carothers asserts that each country
shares three central characteristics. First, democratic openings were prompted, in part, by
democratization in other countries. Second, illiberal regimes were undermined by
prolonged economic distress. Third, each country witnessed popular mobilization for
democratic reforms. Moreover, each of the four countries has encountered difficulty in
consolidating their democracy. This reality leads Carothers to state: “All four countries
13

point up a critical difficulty of democratization: transforming state institutions into
competent, effective entities. In all four, most of the core state institutions have remained
citadels of corruption, incompetence, and inefficiency throughout the process” (Carothers
1999, 81).
It is from the case studies that Carothers presents four assessments of the
prospects and limitations of democracy assistance. First, in political systems where
democratization is advancing, democracy assistance can have a useful, though minor, role
in advancing the transition. Second, in political systems where democratization has
become stagnant, or even begun to backslide, democracy assistance initiatives are
unlikely to put the system back on track. Carothers claims democracy programs at most
can support pockets of reform to help maintain some political opening (Carothers 1999,
341). Third, in non-democratic political systems with no signs of a democratic opening,
assistance is limited to promoting a democratic vanguard. Finally, in political systems
that are trending towards authoritarian governance, democracy aid may support civic
initiatives advocating against the trend; nevertheless, aid is not a sufficient substitute for
these forces. Carothers concludes by stating: “No dramatic results should be expected
from democracy promotion efforts.” He continues to say, “Democracy promotion must
be approached as a long-term, uncertain venture” (Carothers 1999, 351).
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Table 2
The Democracy Template
___________________________________________________________
Sector
Electoral Process

State Institutions

Civil Society

Sector Goal
Free and fair elections

Type of Aid
Electoral aid

Strong national
political parties

Political party building

Democratic constitution

Constitution assistance

Independent, effective
judiciary and other laworiented institutions

Rule-of-law aid

Competent,
representative legislature

Legislative strengthening

Responsive local
government

Local government
development

Pro-democracy military

Civil-military relations

Active advocacy NGOs

NGO building

Politically educated
citizenry

Civic education

Strong independent
media

Media strengthening

Strong independent
unions

Union building

Source: Carothers, Thomas. 1999. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: 88.
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Supporting Civil Society
The significance of civil society in democracy assistance is addressed by Julie
Hearn and Mark Robinson in “Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa.” In
their analysis, Hearn and Robinson present three schools of thought regarding civil
society. The first two schools are associated with Northern notions on civic associational
life, while the third school presents a contemporary concept of civil society as
experienced in Southern political systems.
The Tocqueville school defines civil society as: “The sphere of associational life,
in which citizens organize themselves into horizontal associations and networks that cut
across and transcend traditional social relationships founded on patron-client ties” (Hearn
and Robinson year, 242). Next, the Locke school conceptualizes civil society as a check
on an authoritarian state, where citizens mobilize to enlarge the political sphere while
advocating for the protection of their political and civil rights (Hearn and Robinson year,
242). Finally, the Marxist school serves as the foundation for contemporary thought on
civil society in African political systems. Within this school, emphasis is placed on
citizens’ associational behavior in the economic sphere, as opposed to the public sphere.
In the context of Africa, this school identifies three competing civil societies: a
“predatory state elite; an ‘aspiring bourgeoisie’; and a popular civil society” (Hearn and
Robinson year, 243). Under this framework citizen organization in the public sphere is
used as a means to obtain economic influence.
From here Hearn and Robinson explore three African states: Ghana, Uganda, and
South Africa. Their findings from these case studies lead to them to identify three
common trends in democracy assistance to civil society. First, they found that donors
16

favored civil society organization (CSOs) that supported economic and political
liberalization. Next, Hearn and Robinson state that donor support is typically targeted at
CSOs in urban areas that are led by middle-class elites. Finally they state that CSOs have
grown rapidly in many countries, and are primarily supported by foreign aid, thus
rendering them susceptible to the externally imposed donor agendas. Moreover, these
findings lead Hearn and Robinson to conclude: “While donor funding to civil society
organizations has helped to strengthen the legitimacy of democratic political institutions,
the concentration of financial resources on a relatively narrow group of recipient
organizations restrict democratic debate and political participation” (Hearn and Robinson
year, 259).
In Africa, urban centers are disproportionately capital cities, and thus the centers
of government. It is questionable whether CSOs working for democratic causes can
effectively execute their activities outside of urban centers; also infrastructural
impediments are rampant in rural settings outside of cities. Additionally, the depiction of
middle-class elites is also wanting of further clarification. Historically, the middle class
has been the primary advocate for democratic reform. The reality that African CSOs are
led by middle-class elites is endemic in political systems globally. It points to the fact that
these elites may be more effective in leading the charge for democratic reform than
citizens living below the poverty line.
The authors’ assertion that Northern donors disproportionately support CSOs that
align with economic liberalization is valid. But it would be a “slippery-slope” to attribute
these funding tendencies to the Northern-donor community at large. Organizations like
the Soros Open Society Foundation are resoundingly forthright about their mission to
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promote liberal democratic reforms, specifically in African locations. Finally, African
CSOs’ susceptibility to foreign agendas is also a valid assertion. In addition, African
CSOs’ heavy reliance on Northern donors presents sustainability dilemmas for these
organizations. Nevertheless, despite these systemic realities of African civil society,
Hearn and Robinson duly note the overall positive impact of democracy assistance to the
organization of civil society.
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China in Africa

The People’s Republic of China’s 21st century return to Africa has been met with
a great deal of skepticism and foreboding by Western governments. Foreign policy
institutes, based in the United States and Western Europe, have heightened their scrutiny
of Chinese ambitions for an ever-increasing role in African states. Claims depicting
China’s growing economic role in Africa as counterproductive to democratization and
development are made against China. It is against this metanarrative that China seeks to
project itself as the antithesis to Western aid institutions, and thus an ideal partner to
developing African states. Sino-African relations have primarily consisted of inflows of
Chinese foreign direct investment into resource-rich countries.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as, “An investment made to acquire
lasting interest in enterprises operating outside the economy of the investor...[T]he
investor’s purpose is the gain an effective voice in the management of the
enterprise”(United Nations 2002).

The World Trade Organization specifies three

primary categories of FDI: 1) equity capital, 2) reinvest earnings, and 3) other capital,
which is mainly in the form of intra-company loans (World Trade Organization 1996,
57).

Whereas foreign aid is capital flows from external entities that cannot be

explained by market forces, FDI is motivated by profitable returns on investment. To
be specific, when British Petroleum invests in oil exploration in Gabon, it does so with
the intention of receiving a return on its investment, and to obtain an equity stake in oil
discoveries made from its financed explorations. Conversely, foreign aid institutions
allocate revenue without the expectation of a financial return, with aid primarily
provided to advance economic, political and human development.
19

Sino-Africa Relations
Prior to the late 1990s, China’s relations with Africa, to a great degree,
resembled the inward-outward dichotomy that has characterized Chinese foreign
relations throughout history. During the 1960s and 1970s China stood in solidarity
with liberation movements throughout Africa. Given China’s experience with British
colonial occupation, the People’s Republic of China rhetorically supported
revolutionary elements in various African counties. China’s claims of solidarity with
African liberation movements were primarily symbolic.
It was not until the Sino-Soviet split in 1961 that China sought enhanced
relations with newly liberated African states.

Following the Sino-Soviet split, China

become concerned about its isolation from the West and the East, and began to carry
out aid-based diplomacy partnerships with friendly sub-Saharan states.

In 1963,

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai led China’s first high-level delegation tour to Africa
(Segal 1992, 117). From there, the Chinese implemented a military aid program to
assist national liberation movements. Chinese military aid took the form of combat
training, arms, and revenue (Segal 1992, 118).
In 1970, China embarked on its first large-scale aid project in Africa, where it
constructed the Tanzanian-Zambia railway.

Initially, President Julius Nyerere of

Tanzania, and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had sought financing through the
World Bank, and other Western financial institutions. The World Bank rejected the
railroad project as uneconomical. In 1965 the project was brought to Chairman Mao
Tse-tung, who approved the project allocating up to $1 billion to the project’s
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completion. Within a year of financing the Tanzanian-Zambia Railway, China replaced
Great Britain as Tanzania’s primary trading partner (Segal 1992, 118).
Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, China’s policy remained a dual
approach of rhetorical solidarity combined with financial support for African liberation
campaigns.

Moreover, the Western backlash from the 1989 Tiananmen Square

massacre reinforced China’s alignment with its African partners. China continues to
demonstrate benevolence in exchange for its African allies’ loyalty in multilateral
organizations like the United Nations. In “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope,
Significance and Consequences,” Denis Tull notes that in the aftermath of the 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre, “Developing counties were effectively elevated to a
‘cornerstone’ of Chinese foreign policy in an effort to build coalitions to shield Beijing
from western criticism” (Tull 2006, 461). It was through its cornerstone strategy that
China addressed the Western backlash. Through the 1990s China steadily re-emerged
as an ascending global leader.
In turning his attention to Chinese policies during in the 1990s, Tull points to
three primary factors that shape China’s foreign policy during this decade. He argues
that these laid the foundation for China’s aggressive economic policies in developing
states. First, China’s need to shield itself from international outcries prompted it to
build greater solidarity among African states.

Moreover, the Chinese portray U.N.

sanctions as another hegemonic infringement by the North into the domestic affairs of a
Southern state (Tull 2006, 461). Given the history of colonialism and that Africa is
home to heinous authoritarian leaders, Chinese propaganda of being bullied by the
West resonated with many African heads of state.
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Second, China’s increasingly active foreign policy approach was within a
context of growing fear of an unchecked America. The end of the Cold War left the
United States the dominant super power. The Chinese perceive America’s unbridled
hegemony as a threat to its ascent in global leadership (Tull 2006, 461). This reality
prompted China to increase its advocacy for multi-polarity by seeking to construct
“flexible alliances to contain every form of hegemony and build a new and just
international order” (Tull 2006, 461).
Third, Chinese leadership saw the pursuit of a foreign policy agenda as
becoming increasingly necessary for China’s survival. The Asian financial crisis of
1997 demonstrated how international events could have implications for the
Communist Party’s domestic political interests. Tull asserts:
The financial crisis in Asia in 1997 alerted the Chinese leadership to the
risks of economic interdependence as it exposed the vulnerability of the
country’s outward-oriented economy to externals shocks. By implication,
regional and international stability, mainly but not exclusively in economic
terms, turned into strategic objectives (Tull 2006, 461).

These three factors, coupled with high population density, led China once again to
Africa in pursuit of advantageous political relationships, sustainable energy sources,
and access to raw materials.

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa
The turn of the 21st century marks the beginning of a new chapter in SinoAfrican relations. China prompted by the realities of its own development and growth
agenda revamped its foreign policy towards Africa, where it began to pursue pragmatic
investment policies in sub-Saharan countries.

In “Friends and Interests: China’s

Distinctive Links with Africa,” Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong present two FDI
22

approaches of the Chinese that are distinct from the FDI policies of Western states and
transnational corporations. These policy approaches are: the Chinese Model, and the
Beijing Consensus.

Sautman and Hairong claim that under these two approaches

Chinese transnational corporations, and the People’s Republic of China as a whole, are
better positioned to reap the benefits of FDI partnerships with African states. They also
assert that Africa stands to benefit greatly from Chinese FDI as well.
Under the Chinese Model, China’s investment in sectors of strategic importance
to China is combined with aid programs to African states. Often Chinese aid is
allocated to infrastructure projects. The Sautman and Hairong claim:
Chinese bids for resources fare well because they are packaged with
investment and infrastructure loans. China preeminently invests ‘in
longer-neglected infrastructure projects and hardly viable industries’, and
its loans, typically advance at zero or near-zero interest, are often repaid
in natural resources, if they are not canceled entirely (Sautman and
Hairong 2007, 80).

The Chinese model is in stark contrast to Western foreign aid initiatives such as
structural adjustment loans, which require recipient states to implement systemic
economic reforms in exchange for needed loan revenue. China, by contrast, provides
“no-strings attached aid” to the African states that have valuable natural resources.
In analyzing the Chinese model, China’s overwhelming investment in African
oil and rare earths is quite apparent. Chinese energy firms have invested heavily in
exploratory projects, most notably in Angola and Sudan, as well as other African states
with high levels of political instability or with newly discovered oil reserves. Chinese
oil companies are acknowledged as being less risk adverse than their Western
counterparts, and more willing to go to politically volatile areas and invest heavily in
oil discovery projects that have a low initial return (Tull 2006, 468). This can be
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attributed to two factors. First, China’s major oil companies are owned by the Chinese
government (Tull 2006, 469). Unlike privately owned Western oil companies, Chinese
oil companies are subsidized by the state. This works in the Chinese favor, and
provides oil companies with the leverage to invest in oil exploration in political hot
spots throughout Africa. Should political stability be restored, China is then left with
privileged access to the oil supply of the country. Tull affirms this by stating:
Thanks to their willingness to take significant risks, Chinese firms are able
to derive huge profits from rates of return on foreign direct investment,
said to be much higher in politically volatile sub-Saharan Africa than in
other parts of the developing world (Tull 2006, 468).

A second factor is that Chinese oil companies are commissioned to secure
privileged access that will help support China’s increasing demand for oil. Moreover,
since these companies are government owned they are an extension of the state, and
ultimately, can afford the risk in the area of oil discovery, because secured access to
these oil resources is the anticipated return.
In turning to the Beijing Consensus, Sautman and Hairong, present it as a
competing framework to the Washington Consensus. The central tenet of the Beijing
consensus is China’s unrelenting adherence to state sovereignty. Moreover, China has
maintained a non-interference policy in its investment relations with its African
partners. From the perspective of the Chinese, its economic relations with African
states are strictly business relationships. It should be noted that the PRC maintains its
non-interference policy regardless of the state political structure (i.e., liberal democratic
or authoritarian).
China’s non-interference policy is in direct contrast to the Washington
Consensus, made up of the IMF, World Bank, and other Western funding organization,
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which places conditions on loans. Through its non-interference policies, China
appeases African states’ calls for greater autonomy and has contributed to China being
hailed as the ideal development partner by some African policymakers. It should be
noted that China has suspended its non-intervention policy when its economic or
security policies are at risk.
A good example of China’s non-intervention policy is its policy towards Sudan.
In 1996, China acquired a 40 percent ownership stake in Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company, Sudan’s oil production and exploration company. It is estimated
that China has invested nearly $5 dollars in its oil enterprise in Sudan (Tull 2006, 470).
As acts of genocide being carried out by Khartoum against Southern Sudanese in the
Darfur region of the country were brought to international attention, China refused to
acknowledge the situation as a humanitarian crisis, but rather called it an “internal
issue.” China did not adhere to international sanctions on Sudanese oil, and in 2004
used its position on the U.N. Security Council to block any Security Council actions
against Khartoum.
The refusal of China to relent to international pressures on the Darfur genocide
left China as the only importer of Sudanese oil. Tull argues that China’s opposition to
U.N. sanctions against Sudan “perpetuated a highly advantageous status quo” (Tull
2006, 470). He notes: “The peace agreements between Khartoum and the rebels of the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army of January 2005 contain an explicit guarantee for all
oil concessions which the Sudanese state has granted during the war” (Tull 2006, 470).
Sudan is just one example of China’s willingness to partner with pariah states to
advance its energy security policies.
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Another strategic component of the Beijing Consensus is the use of bilateral
trade agreements with African states to advance Chinese export interests. China has
strategically circumvented African multilateral and regional trade commissions and
insists on entering into trade agreements with individual states (Adem 2010, 354-55).
African markets present China with a lucrative opportunity to heavily export
inexpensive consumer goods to developing African states. Often, trade agreements are
included in Chinese FDI contracts, thereby opening the door to Chinese exports to
African markets. Although, African states have the option to export their commodities
to China, these products are at a disadvantage in competing with Chinese commodities
in China’s domestic markets.
Through its development partnerships with Africa, China has also taken
advantage of programs meant to aid Africa. One such program is the United States’
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, which granted African textiles
preferred access to American markets. The Chinese textile industry was ultimately
disadvantaged by AGOA. This caused Chinese textiles companies to relocate their
factories to African locations.

Once the AGOA ended in 2005, Chinese textiles

companies relocated back to China, leaving tens of thousands of textile workers in
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Kenya unemployed (Tull 2006, 472).

Evaluating the outcomes of Sino-African Relations
The unfulfilled promise of Chinese foreign direct investment to bring increased
employment opportunities for Africans is becoming a growing concern for African
states. Although Chinese investment in African infrastructure projects has increase
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construction jobs in many sub-Saharan cities, migrant labor from China is primarily
used in infrastructure projects. In the case of Angola, one of China’s primary oil
suppliers, migrant workers have been brought to Angola to complete its infrastructure
projects. Tull claims:
China’s hard-nosed economic interests are also reflected in Angola,
where some 2,500 Chinese workers have arrived to work for Chinese
companies whose work will be financed by the oil-backed loans that
Beijing granted to the Angolan government. According to one source, a
total of 30,000 Chinese workers are expected eventually in Angola (Tull
2006, 473).

Given China’s economic superiority it is difficult to ascertain whether African
states as a whole will truly benefit from Chinese economic policies. Although the
Chinese model to foreign investment, which combines investment with desperately
needed infrastructure aid, provides a promising opportunity to African states, it is
questionable whether the benefits of these programs are undermined by other aspects of
China’s economic policy. In the case of Angola, Chinese requirements that contracts
for infrastructure projects be awarded to Chinese companies, which rely heavily upon
Chinese migrant labor, undermines the development of a modern African labor force.
Granted, China, like any other international actor, is protecting its economic interests as
it should. However, this reality should be kept in mind when China claims that its
agenda is best for Africa.
The political ramifications of Chinese economic policy are detrimental to Africa
democratization. The Chinese protection of pariah states, under the guise of noninterference policies, is dangerous for African political development and may present
unintended ramifications for China’s economic interests in Africa. In addition, as
China rises in global power, the Chinese may find it increasingly difficult to pursue a
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policy of non-interference. Furthermore, like most international actors, China will
begin to weigh the cost and benefits of involving itself in the political affairs of its
African partners. China, like many Western states, may pursue non-interference as it
advances its foreign policy interests. However, China will not hesitate to change its
policy towards African sovereignty should its investments be threatened.
In “Towards a Critical Geopolitics of China’s Engagement With African
Development,” Marcus Powers and Giles Mohan assert:
The Chinese are themselves well aware that their non-interference stance
is untenable in Africa. Given that the economic relationship matters to
China, its government has a vest interest in long-term stability…(Power
and Mohan 2010, 482).

China’s desire for peace in Africa is apparent in its involvement in U.N. peacekeeping
missions, particularly in Liberia. During the Liberian civil war, China continued to
purchase Liberian timber despite mounting international pressure to end trade with the
state. It was the revenue from timber sales that kept the warlord regime of Liberian
president Charles Taylor in office.

However, after Taylor left office, China

participated in an UN peacekeeping mission to restore order to the war-torn state.
China apparently sought to demonstrate its continued support for the Liberian
government while attempting to circumvent any

international backlash from its

relations with Taylor’s regime. China’s peacekeeping mission to Liberia presents an
example of how China is increasingly implementing a policy of selective noninterference (Power and Mohan 2010, 482). It should be noted that this is a policy
practiced by many states in the international system.
China’s oil investment policies in war-torn, resource-rich countries embolden
authoritarian regimes.

Resource-rich countries in Africa are some of the societies
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hardest hit by war and humanitarian crises because of constant conflict for control over
natural resources. China’s investment in these areas, in an attempt to advance its
resource security agenda, has had devastating consequences for these countries and
their neighbors. For example, in the instance of Sudan, proceeds from Chinese oil
investment potentially were used to perpetrate acts of genocide against the South
Sudanese.
The analysis of Chinese-African relations has explored the opportunities, as
well as the shortcomings, of Chinese FDI in Africa. It must be noted that the policy
approach implemented by China is not different from approaches utilized by Western
governments during the high stakes Cold War era. Although China presents African
states with opportunities for growth and infrastructure development, these opportunities
are aimed at primarily profiting the Chinese, which legitimately falls within the Chinese
national interests. Although Chinese FDI is presented as a promising alternative to
foreign aid, it is apparent that Chinese investments hold adverse implications for
democratization and may potentially perpetuate the political circumstances that lead to
state failure in Africa. Though the People’s Republic of China portrays itself as an
ideal development partner for African countries, its policies make it poised to take up
the role of neo-colonial actor in sub-Saharan political economies.
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Empirical Findings
Origins of the Data
The Freedom House Foundation is an American-based public policy institute.
Since 1972, Freedom House has published an annual index that measures the global level
of political freedom and civil liberty. The Freedom in the World Index provides an indepth survey of the level of political and civil freedom enjoyed by the individual in a
country. The political rights rating is determined by three factors: the electoral process,
political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. Additionally,
the civil liberty rating is determined by freedom of expression and belief, associational
and organization rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.
Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7 by the Freedom in the World Index. A
rating of 1 signifies the highest level of freedom, while a 7 signifies the lowest level of
freedom. The following overall freedom statuses: Free (F), Partially Free (PF), and Not
Free (NF), are determined by the country’s political rights and civil liberty rating. The
freedom status is attained by averaging the political rights and civil liberty scores. An
average of 1.0 to 2.5 is free; 3.0 to 5.0 is partially free; and 5.5 to 7 is not free. The
Freedom House Foundation contends that the status of free does not signify that a country
is perfectly free or without serious political problems, but rather that a free state enjoys
more liberal democratic freedoms compared to a partially free state. The following table
provides the 10-year aggregate ratings of African countries states on the Freedom in the
World Index.
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Table 3
Ten-Year Aggregate score (2001 - 2011)
Political
Civil
Country
Rights Liberties Status
Angola
6
5.1
NF
Benin
2.2
2
F
Botswana
2.2
2
F
Burkina Faso
5.2
3.4
PF
Cameroon
6
6
NF
Cape Verde
1.1
1.2
F
Central African Republic
5.3
4.8
PF
Chad
6.4
5.5
NF
Congo (Brazzaville)
5.6
4.6
PF
Congo (Kinshasa)
5.8
6
NF
6.2
5.4
NF
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
4.9
5
PF
Equatorial Guinea
6.9
6.3
NF
Eritrea
7
7.4
NF
Ethiopia
5.1
5.1
PF
Gabon
5.6
4.4
PF
Gambia, The
5.1
4.7
PF
Ghana
1.4
2.2
F
Guinea
6.1
5.1
NF
Guinea-Bissau
4.1
4.2
PF
Kenya
3.8
3.4
PF
Lesotho
2.4
3.1
F*
Liberia
4.2
4.6
PF
Madagascar
3.8
4.4
PF
Malawi
4.1
3.8
PF
Mali
2
2.6
F
Mauritania
5.5
5.1
PF
Mauritius
1
1.8
F
Mozambique
3.2
3.6
PF
Namibia
2
1.4
F
Niger
3.7
3.7
PF
Nigeria
4.2
4.2
PF
Rwanda
6.2
5.1
NF
Sao Tome & Principe
1.8
2
F
Senegal
2.4
3.1
F*
Seychelles
3.3
3
PF
Sierra Leone
3.6
3.3
PF
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Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

6.5
1.5
7
6.8
4
5.5
5.2
3.6
6.5

7
1.8
7
5
3.1
4.8
4.1
3.9
6

NF
F
NF
NF
PF
PF
PF
PF
NF

Source: Freedom House Foundation. “Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores.”
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores.

An analysis of the status of African countries on the Freedom House Index
suggests that sub-Saharan countries consistently are rated as partially free. Twenty-five
countries are listed as partially free; 13 countries have the status of not free, while only
eight African countries are acknowledged as free.

An examination of the African

countries ratings from 2001 to 2011 is significant because it marks the decade after the
initial implementation of aid conditionality and the development of democracy assistance
as a field in foreign aid. Moreover, the disproportionate amount of partially free states in
Africa substantiates the conclusions of Goldsmith, Carothers and Brown that democracy
consolidation is an arduous long-term endeavor. Furthermore, despite the best intentions
of Western democracy promoters, the impetus for liberal democratic consolidation in
African countries must come from local actors.

United States Aid Recipients in Africa
In turning to country-specific aid allocation practices, the following table captures
the leading African recipients of U.S. assistance. These figures are based on the U.S.
Congressional budget request submitted by USAID. There is a noticeable heterogeneity
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in the freedom levels of countries the United States aids. In fact, six of the countries are
free, while 14 are partially free, and eight are not free. Additionally, it appears that aid
by the United States is region-selective, such that five of the top 10 USAID recipients are
located in East Africa. These countries are: Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and
Sudan.

Table 4
Leading U.S. Assistance Recipients in Africa
($ in millions)

Country
Uganda a
Kenya a
South Africa a
Nigeria a
Zambia a
Ethiopia a
Tanzania a
Sudan
Mozambique a
Somalia
Liberia
Rwanda a
Namibia a
Botswana a
Mali
Dem. Rep.
Congo
Ghana
Malawi
Senegal
Cote d’Ivoire a
Madagascar
Angola
Guinea
Benin
Guinea
Benin
Zimbabwe
Djibouti

FY 2012
Requested
527.7
751.4
561.9
660.4
400.7
608.3
571.8
518.2
424.5
82.3
211.4
241.3
99.6
71.8
171.7
261.8

FY 2011
Actual
456.1
661.8
571.1
632.3
385.0
519.0
501.7
400.2
386.6
98.4
203.1
220.7
103.2
75.4
137.7
215.9

FY 2010
Actual
456.8
687.6
577.5
614.1
392.9
533.2
462.5
427.7
386.9
133.8
226.1
208.1
102.8
77.3
117.8
183.0

FY 2009
Actual
404.1
829.4
544.8
594.2
308.1
864.8
646.9
924.1
317.9
403.8
224.0
195.8
112.0
81.4
102.6
296.5

204.5
201.6
119.8
142.4
78.8
27.8
13.6
29.1
13.6
29.1
109.9
7.3

165.8
169.7
98.7
108.0
71.6
60.9
25.0
31.0
25.0
31.0
97.3
8.5

138.8
145.7
106.3
133.6
86.4
84.2
22.0
36.4
22.0
36.4
89.0
9.4

147.5
115.6
93.7
113.7
71.0
55.9
13.3
30.9
13.3
30.9
292.3
5.8
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Sierra Leone
Burundi

22.7
37.6

19.4
35.6

31.1
40.4

20.0
39.4

Source: Ted Dagne, 2011. “Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues.” Congressional Research Services.
a
Global AIDS Initiative “Focus” Country.

Two factors account for the concentration of USAID assistance in East Africa.
First, this region in Africa is prone to terrorist activity. In 1998, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks
were simultaneously carried out against two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. Additionally, state failure in Sudan and Somalia has made the Horn of
Africa a hotbed of terrorist activity, which is evident in the heightened instances of piracy
occurring along the coasts of the Indian Ocean. The United States provides security
assistance to the region for counterterrorism operations and supports the African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI) in its training of African armies for peacekeeping missions
(Dagne 2011, 4). Second, state failure in Somalia and Sudan has brought about a
humanitarian crisis within the region. Countries like Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia have
been overwhelmed with migrant refugee populations, and this humanitarian crisis has
resulted in USAID assistance.

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa
Accurately identifying African recipients of Chinese FDI is difficult given the
lack of transparency by the Chinese. This reality is addressed by Thomas Lum, Specialist
in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service. In his analysis, Lum employs a
study conducted by the Wagner Graduate School of New York University. The study
examines eight African countries; it reports their primary export to China, along with the
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type of aid pledged to the African recipient country, and finally the purpose of the
pledged aid. All of the countries studied exported natural resources to China. These
exported resources are either in the form of oil, minerals, or raw materials.

Table 5
Selected African Countries with Large Reported Aid and Investment Projects,
2002 - 2007
Country

Main Export to
China

Major Types of
Financing (as
Reported)

Major Types of
Projects Financed
(as Reported)

Oil

Pledged Aid,
Loans, Credit
Lines, and
Investment
$7.4 billion

Angola a b c

Loans, interestfree loans, credit
lines

Infrastructure
(railways)

Congo (DRC) a

Oil, Minerals

$5 billion

Loans

Infrastructure,
mining

Sudan

Oil

$4.2 billion

Investment,
loan, grants

Oil refining,
infrastructure, hydro
power, humanitarian

Gabon d

Oil, minerals

$3 billion

Investment,
Grants

Iron ore mining,
infrastructure, port
facilities, hydro
power

Mozambique

Wood, ores

$2.4 billion

Dam construction,
infrastructure,
national stadium

Equatorial Guinea

Oïl

$ 2 billion

Oil drilling
rights

$2 billion
(includes 2008
aid of $150
million)

Debt
cancellation,
concessional
loans, grants
Concessional
loans, credit
lines
Loans, grants,
investment

bc

bc

Ethiopia
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Not specified

Infrastructure,
telecommunications,
public buildings,
hydropower, light
industry

Nigeria a b

Oil

$1.6 billion

Debt
cancellation,
investments,
grants

Off shore oil
development,
infrastructure
(railways), medical
training

Source: New York University, Wagner School. “Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A look at China’s
Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, April 25, 2008.”
a.
b.
c.
d.

Major African Trading Partner of China
Loan Payment in Oil
Major Africa Oil Supplier of China
Loan payment in minerals

Comparative study of Chinese FDI Recipients and USAID Recipients

This paper’s fundamental hypothesis is that African states receiving Chinese FDI
and aid will be disproportionately evaluated to be non-democratic, whereas states
receiving USAID and World Bank assistance will be deemed more democratic. To test
my hypothesis, I will analyze the consequence of USAID and Chinese assistance on
democratization in Africa. Concretely, I will compare the freedom status of the recipients
of Chinese FDI and infrastructure aid to that of the recipients of USAID and World Bank
assistance. I will show that Sudan is an example of how Chinese assistance in the form
of FDI and loans in exchange for access to oil has undermined humanitarian assistance by
USAID and the World Bank.
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USAID & World Bank

Chinese FDI & Aid

Table 6
Chinese FDI & Aid vs. USAID &World Bank
Democratic States

Non-Democratic States






Gabon (PF:5)
Ethiopia (PF:5.1)
Mozambique (PF:3.4)
Nigeria (PF:5.1)

























Uganda (PF:4.64)
Kenya (PF:3.6)
South Africa (F:1.65)
Tanzania (PF:3.55)
Zambia (PF:3.75)
Nigeria (PF:5.1)
Ethiopia (PF:5.1)
Mozambique (PF:3.4)
Liberia (PF:4.4)
Namibia (F:1.7)
Botswana (F:2.1)
Mali (F:2.3)
Ghana (F:1.8)
Malawi (PF:3.95)
Senegal (PF:2.75)
Madagascar (PF:4.1)
Benin (F:2.1)
Djibouti (PF:4.9)
Sierra Leone (PF:3.45)
Burundi (PF:4.3)
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Angola (NF:5.55)
Democratic Republic of
Congo (NF:5.9)
Sudan (NF:7)
Equatorial Guinea (NF:6.6)

Sudan (NF:7)
Somalia (NF:6.75)
Rwanda (NF:5.65
Democratic Republic of
Congo (NF:5.9)
Angola (NF:5.55)
Guinea (NF:5.6)
Cote d’Ivoire (NF:5.8)
Zimbabwe (NF:6.25)

China’s non-interference approach to aid allocation provides recipient countries
with an alternative to Western donors as well as Western lending institutions.
Unfortunately, the provision of unconditioned aid to an African government has been
observed to have adverse ramifications to the level of freedom and democracy in the
recipient country. For example, both Ethiopia and Gabon experienced a decline following
the receipt of unconditioned aid from China; such that the freedom status of both
countries rapidly declined from partially free in 2009 to not free in 2010 and 2011. No
government receiving Chinese aid saw an increase in its freedom status. In contrast,
USAID recipients like Burundi, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone were elevated from
the status of not free to partially free during 2001 to 2011. Additionally, only one USAID
or World Bank recipient, Senegal, experienced a decline in status from free to partially
free. A decline in freedom status from partially free to not free was only manifested in
two recipients of USAID and World Bank conditioned aid. Both Djibouti and Ethiopia
declined from partially free to not free in 2011 and in 2010, respectively. Nevertheless,
none of the recipient countries of USAID and World Bank assistance saw their freedom
status increase from partially free to free.
Regardless of the 10 years of conditional aid donated by USAID and the World
Bank, surprisingly, not a single African state experienced a rise in their status from
partially free to free. Aid conditionality and democracy assistance are thus insufficient to
bringing about democracy consolidation to African states. The concluding section will
address the structural barriers to democratization and democracy consolidation in African
political systems, and the limited effectiveness of democracy assistance to overcome
these obstacles.
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Conclusion

The democratic wave that swept across Africa in the early 1990s took the West by
surprise. Africa was believed to lack the essential components that have historically
contributed to democratic openings. In a continent made up of low-income economies,
African countries typically lacked a viable middle-class. Additionally, low literacy
plagued these societies, and years of autocratic governance blocked a civic culture of
popular participation (Brown and Kaiser 2008, 249). However, the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1989, with reforms to the aid policies of donors, provided a critical juncture for
democratic openings in African countries.
During the 1990s, the world witnessed a historic number of multi-party elections
being held across the continent, and 29 African governments adopted new constitutions.1
Nevertheless, despite these liberal political advancements, the full incorporation of
democratic governance has been muted, giving way to a “deficit of democracy”
throughout the continent.

Therefore, although the 1990s brought unprecedented

democratic openings across the continent, backsliding towards illiberal governance has
thwarted full consolidation of democracy in Africa. In this section I will discuss the
impediments to democracy in Africa, and furthermore, how these hindrances undermine
the consolidation of liberal democratic governance.

1

Angola, 1992; Benin, 1990; Burkina Faso, 1991; Burundi, 1992; Cape Verde, 1992; Central Africa
Rebulic, 1995; Chad, 1996; Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 1992; Democratic Republic of Congo
(Kinshasa), 1993; Djibouti, 1992; Equatorial Guinea, 1991; Eritrea, 1996; Gabon, 1991; The Gambia,
1997; Ghana, 1992; Lesotho, 1993; Malawi, 1994; Mali, 1992; Mauritania, 1991; Manibia, 1990; Niger,
1999; Nigera, 1999; Rwanda, 1991; Setchelles, 1993; Sierra Leone, 1991; South Africa, 1996; Togo, 1991;
Uganda, 1995; Zambia, 1991 (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book).
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Challenges to Democracy
Post-colonial African political systems have been afflicted with the legacy of
autocratic governance. In contrast to Western democracies, African democracies are
generally structured to value the executive over other branches of government.
Historically, following the independence of their respective states, popularly elected
African presidents typically governed under what has become caricaturized as the Big
Man Syndrome, where patron-client relationships were combined with authoritarian
oppression to buffer the executive branch from political opposition.

Though many

contemporary African states allow their citizens to freely exercise civil liberty, African
political economies continue to be governed by elites that enjoy relatively unchecked
authority and a great deal of discretion with regard to the allocation of public goods.
Indeed, the concept of Neopatrimonialism pervades African political systems.

This

system and allows elected officials to distribute state resources in a manner that advances
the personal prerogatives of the ruling elite, thereby undermining transparency, and thus
implicating government accountability (Brown and Kaiser 2008, 249). In conjunction
with neopatrimonialism, the big man syndrome style of governance weakens systems of
checks and balances, and thus the rule of law. Despite democracy promotion efforts by
the West, big man syndrome and neopatrimonialism, persist in African political systems
and are antithetical to democracy.
Next, the politicalization of ethnic identity impedes the development of robust
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, in African countries political affiliation
is centered upon ethnicity as opposed to social class or interest. This renders elections a
competition between ethnic groups for control of state resources, therefore exacerbating
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neopatrimonialism. The grave consequences of ethnic-based politics were witnessed in
Kenya following the 2007 presidential election.

In retrospect that election can be

characterized as a contest between the most prominent politicians of the country’s largest
ethnic groups.

In 2007, President Mwai Kibaki of the Kikuyu community was

challenged by Raila Odinga a Luo, the candidate of the Orange Democratic Party, a
coalition made up of minority ethnic groups. Although voter turnout was high, the
election was highly disputed and widely recognized as flawed. Nevertheless, Kibaki was
declared the winner, and quickly sworn into his second term in office amid allegations of
election tampering. Immediately following the 2007 election, Kenya erupted in violence,
and episodes of ethnic cleansing were carried out in the rural cities throughout the
country. The post-election conflict continued for nearly 100 days, and did not end until a
power-sharing agreement was reached, which created the position of prime minister for
Odinga. Since the Kenyan constitution establishes the president as both the head of
government and head of state, it was unclear what official duties would be entrusted to
the prime minister.
The violent aftermath of the 2007 election startled the international community.
While Kenya, like most African countries, has a history of autocratic rule, it is widely
recognized as being a stable country in East Africa, a region often plagued with conflict
and state failure, Additionally, Kenya is a close ally of the United States and has enjoyed
the benefits of partnering with America during the Cold War and the Global War on
Terror.
Nevertheless, the politicization of ethnic rivalries is not new to Kenya President
Daniel arap Moi strategically fomented ethnic conflict to insulate himself from domestic
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and international appeals for democratic reforms. This occurred in 1992 when Kenya
held its first multiparty general election since independence in 1963. Prior to the 1992
general election, episodes of ethnic conflict were incited by Moi supporters in the Rift
Valley region. This was done strategically to display the turmoil the country would face
if Moi were not returned to office. As a result, Moi was re-elected in 1992 and served
two additional terms until he exceeded his term limits in 2002. The lack of a strong
political party platform will continue to allow for the politicization of ethnicity, which
will hamper the democratization of Africa states.
Finally, the economic reality of African political systems affects the level of civil
liberty an individual citizen can attain.

President Nelson Mandela of South Africa

captured this reality when he stated, “Freedom is meaningless if people cannot put food
in their stomachs” (Bratton and Mattes 2001, 447). With the continent being composed
of low-income political economies, individual citizens are preoccupied with ensuring
their survival.

The average citizen is thus hindered from fully exercising the due

diligence needed to hold their leaders accountable. In countries plagued with widespread
poverty, pandemics, prolonged civil wars over natural resources, and ethnic conflict,
democracy and the demand for greater accountability is a luxury that many Africans
cannot readily afford (Collier 2007). Moreover, rampant corruption and a general lack of
transparency by African leaders are intended to keep the citizenry ignorant of the
operation of government.
These continent-specific realities, plus the absence of local government, leads to
Delegative Democracy in African political systems (Bratton and Logan 2009). Under
this governing model, citizens elect parliamentarians from their ethno-regional
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community and entrust to them not only political representation, but sole governing
authority. The drawback to delegative democracy is that elections can become a citizen’s
only avenue to hold elected officials accountable (Bratton and Logan 2009). With most
African politicians enjoying 4- to 5-year terms, sporadic elections are weak instruments
to hold leaders accountable. The notion that Africans have become mere voters in
elections rather than actively engaged citizens is a recurring theme in literature on
democratization in Africa. Arguably, these continent-specific realities help to explain
why the role of citizen is not fully realized by Africans, and why liberal democracy, in its
fullest form, remains beyond reach in states across the continent.

Assessing the Consequences of Democracy Assistance in Africa: Findings from Kenya

Several scholars argue that foreign aid has done nothing more than fund
unsustainable democratic experiments in Africa. They claim that democracy assistance
can ultimately undermine democratization because politicians become answerable to
donors instead of their constituents. An additional common criticism of democracy
assistance is that it causes quick transitions to electoral democracy before a foundation
for liberal democratic governance can be established by domestic actors.
Although these may appear valid objections to democracy assistance, it should be
recognized that the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 provided political movements within
countries throughout the world the momentum, moral authority, as well as the critical
juncture, to challenge authoritarian and autocratic regimes. In the context of Africa,
democracy assistance of the early 1990s provided desperately needed resources to civic
agitation that had been brewing below the surface.
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Although the initial wave of

multiparty elections held across Africa in the early 1990s did not instantly remove
illiberal regimes, during this decade many African governments were put on paths to
incorporate liberal political reforms.
Turning to Kenya, in 2006 I took part in a study abroad program at the University
of Nairobi.

During my studies, I obtained a research affiliation with the National

Convention Executive Council (NCEC). Founded in 1997, the NCEC is the executive
organ of the National Convention Assembly (NCA), a civic association composed of
non-governmental organizations from various sectors of civil society. Since its inception,
the NCA has championed the adoption of liberal democratic political reforms and has
stood at the forefront of the civic movement for a new Kenyan constitution. During my
tenure with the NCEC, I served as the Intern of Constitutional Reform Education and
Advocacy. Additionally, through my research affiliation I collaborated with the Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), Kenya’s statutory human rights
agency. During my time with these indigenous organizations, I participated in public
forums and activities that were dedicated to ensuring a peaceful general election in 2007.
My field work in Kenya contributed to my undergraduate thesis: “Legalized
Repression: A Case Study of the Kenyan Constitution and the Movement for Liberal
Political Reform.” This paper utilized critical junction theory to examine the Kenyan
constitution movement. My thesis argued that Kenya was presented with a constitutional
moment following the 2002 election of President Kibaki, and that this opportunity was
squandered due to illiberal, antithetical political interests. Furthermore, I concluded that
it was unlikely that Kenya would ever ratify an entirely new liberal democratic
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constitution.

Rather, political leaders would continue to pragmatically amend the

founding constitution in a piecemeal fashion to address reforms as they arose.
My prediction was proven wrong. The crisis which followed Kenya’s 2007
presidential election demanded sweeping change as opposed to the gradual progressive
amendments I had predicted almost a year earlier. The violent aftermath of the 2007
presidential election again provided Kenya another constitutional moment. In 2010, the
Republic of Kenya held its second constitutional referendum, in which it ratified a new
constitution founded upon the tenets of liberal democratic governance. The adoption of
a new Kenyan constitution marks progress for the country. However, it is yet to be seen
whether the principles of liberal governance will be fully embraced by Kenyan political
leaders.
The Kenyan constitution movement, in essence, captures the challenges in
assessing the consequences of democracy assistance in Africa.

Democratization is a

long and unsteady process that is being severely challenged by powerful domestic
undercurrents seeking to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, foreign aid in the form of
democracy assistance will often fail to fully achieve the intended outcome set forth by
donors.

In conclusion, given this reality, donors should conceptualize democracy

assistance as a risky investment where returns are uncertain.
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